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JOB, JUNG AND FREUD: AN ESSAY ON THE MEANING OF LIFE*

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THE name of Job is not to be found in any of Freud's writings and he has seemingly never concerned himself with this most precious and evocative book. And yet there is ample warrant for linking Freud with Job, and both with Jung. The latter is the more obvious, for Jung[1] has but recently published a tortured work which he offered, substantively and by title, as an *Answer to Job*. Freud, too, proffered an answer to Job, but by indirection only, and under several titles: *Totem and Taboo*[2], *The Future of an Illusion*[3], and *Moses and Monotheism*[4].

It must prove immensely interesting and profitable to analyze the answers to Job given by Freud, the skeptical Jew, and by Jung, the ambivalent Protestant and believing Christian. It must prove even more illuminating to explore, in its entrancing profundities, the problem of Job—in the light of the answers given by Freud and Jung.

But first *it is desirable to define* what *is* the problem of Job? At its simplest it can be stated as "the problem of evil". (*Vide* Albion

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Roy King, professor of Ethics and Religion at Cornell College[5].) Why is there evil in life? Why does evil befall the innocent, the young, the blameless, the just, the virtuous? Why are not the wicked ever and always and in the measure of their wickedness smitten with evil?

But this is the problem of Job phrased at its most elementary and most primitive level. The problem of Job concerns also the relation of man to God, and of God to Man. Can and does God love and favor the man Job, whom he freely exposes to the malevolent trials of Satan? And can Job persist in his devotion to God, despite all his unmerited affliction? Why does not Job follow his wife's counsel—to curse God and die—since that would so obviously "square accounts" with his Creator, and bring a final end to his torturesome afflictions?

The problem of Job involves much more. It embraces the all-encompassing problem of "what is life about"—what is its meaning—and how can the sentient man meaningfully relate himself to its puzzling, paradoxical, frustrating adventures, and to its inevitable terminus in death.

The Book of Job is a post-exilic masterpiece, and its composition is dated circa 400 B.C. It has engaged the interest of innumerable scholars throughout the ages, down to our own times. One of the very finest expositions of The Book of Job was published in 1920 by Morris Jastrow, Jr. of the University of Pennsylvania[6]. His analysis of the text as given in the Hebrew and in the King James version of 1611, leads him to the conviction that in both versions the original Book was altered and corrupted by the inclusion of commentaries and addenda of later origin. In an appendix to his work Jastrow gives the redeemed version of the Book of Job.

The misadversions of the Job text are significant and meaningful to us over and above their exegetic burdens. They reflect some of the early efforts to include in the Book of Job an answer to, as well as the statement of, the problem of Job. Thus it is clear that the four speeches of Elihu represent, as Jastrow phrases it, "an endeavor to find a solution that might save the day for orthodoxy" (ref. 6, p. 82). And the happy ending of the story of Job, wherein Jahveh restores everything to Job in double amount, and prolongs his days on earth to twice the biblical span of three score and ten, argues for the immediacy of the rewards which the Almighty allegedly grants to the worthy,

this side of heaven. It pleads that all the plaints of Job to the contrary notwithstanding, not evil but justice reigns supreme in life, and in God's relation to man. That, too, is the later-day "answer" proffered by orthodoxy. In the original, the problem of Job remained unanswered, an open question propounded by one of heroic dimensions—a man to challenge God.

The Book of Job, universally acknowledged as *the* masterpiece of the Old Testament and as one of the great creations in world literature, suffers from its celebrity. It is more famed than known; more praised than read. I think then it might be the better part of discretion to treat ourselves to a resumé of the story of Job.

> "Job is described as a man living in the land of Uz. He is a 'perfect' and upright man, one that feared God and eschewed evil. He possesses great wealth and a large family of sons and daughters, on whose behalf he is continually offering sacrifices, to guard against the consequences of some possible secret infidelity on their part. On a certain day, when Satan appears with the Sons of God before the Almighty, the Patriarch is instanced as a perfect man. Satan, however, suggests that his piety is dependent on his wealth, and that if he loses this he will renounce God. Accordingly, Satan is allowed to put him to the test. But even after he has stripped Job of all his possessions and slain all his children, Job says: 'The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord.' Still Satan challenges Job's piety; so long as the man himself escapes unscathed, he still has something to fear, and he worships God to save his skin. 'But put forth thine hand now, and touch his bone and his flesh, and he will curse thee to thy face.' So Satan is allowed to go to any lengths short of actually killing the man. He smites Job 'with sore boils from the sole of his foot unto his crown.' Even Job's wife now fails him, and counsels him to 'curse God and die.' But Job rebukes her saying, shall we receive good at the hand of God, and shall we not receive evil?' Three friends then appear, and for seven days sit by him in mute sympathy. At last Job breaks out in bitter lamentations over his undeserved fate. For this Eliphaz rebukes him, declaring that misfortune is never undeserved. Job answers him, and each of the other accusing friends in turn. But the more he persists in upholding his righteousness, the more vehement his friends become. Job then appeals from man to God. Would that he could find the seat of the Almighty Himself, and there make his defense, and hear the Almighty's words. A fourth friend appears, Elihu, who insists that the power of God silences all question of his justice. Job, he says, is wrong in appealing against the sentence of the Almighty and the Inscrutable. God can have nothing to lose or gain by Job's actions, he cannot be motivated by a vindicative spirit against him, and can only be influenced by pure justice. There the great climax of the

> drama is reached. The Deity himself appears in the whirlwind and charges Job with presumption—overwhelming him by the tale of his power and wisdom in Nature. Finally, Job confesses his folly and repents 'in dust and ashes.' The friends are rebuked, while Job is approved. After this Job is restored to greater prosperity than ever, and becomes the father of seven sons and three daughters, as before."

Told thus, we have the skeleton but none of the flesh, the beauty, and the inspiration, of the Book of Job. In beauty and sublimity it matches the best ever written by man, from Homer and Aeschylus, to our own. But for the present we are less concerned with the sublimity of the form than with the profundity of the problem which the Book of Job expounds. On this score, however, we must first formulate a certain basis of agreement–agreement as to the essence and nature of the problem.

It can be argued, as indeed it has been, that the Book of Job embodies not one but a host of problems. One can, so to say, find in Job whatever issue in ethics and religion one has a mind to discover. That, however, is not a criticism but rather an attestation to the inspirational fertility of the Book of Job. This is indeed a great work and one may read into it, and draw from it, a variety of meanings and insights, even as one can from its distant homologue–Goethe's *Faust*. Still we must define what *in* and *of* the Book of Job concerns us initially and predominantly. In a measure that has already been affirmed in the very title of this essay. Our initial concern with the Book of Job is psychological. We are interested in discovering to what extent the story of Job represents the story of everyman; how deeply the problem of evil, so sharply brought into relief in the tale of Job's afflictions, corresponds to the problem of evil inherent in the living experience of everyman–this day as in the days of Job.

To begin then, we must agree that the Book of Job is not the unique tale of a mythical personage, but rather the parabolic, or allegorical statement of a timeless issue that darkens man's existence, expressed with moving eloquence and deep passion, in the name of Job. We can find its counterpart among the dramas of the Greek playwrights, in the Oedipus trilogy of Sophocles, and in the *Medea* of Euripides to instance some. Job is patently everyman! What happened to Job is a large scale representation of what typifies the human lot. True, it does not fall to everyman's lot to be bereft at once of fortune and

family, to be afflicted with loathsome disorders, and to be upbraided and made suspect by the very friends who had come to console him. But then the Book of Job is composed with the accents of genius, transmuting the prosaic misadventures of life's experience into epic revelations.

Any one of the several misfortunes that befell Job would have sufficed to try his patience, and to test his faith in God's justice and mercy. But stark and overfreighted as the tale of Job's afflictions may be, its wholeness, its totality, its cumulative impact, brings it closer to the actuality of human fate than would have the exposition of a singular misfortune. For in its larger sense the Book of Job treats of human destiny and not merely of the caprice of misfortune.

The bereavement of age falls upon all who senesce, and Job was 70 when put on trial. The aged uniformly are bereft of their possessions, be they fortune, kin, friends, peace, or well being. Death is the crowning outrage. No man then can find pristine or ultimate justice this side of heaven, and some suspect that heaven itself was invented to provide the promise of an equilibration of justice and injustice, beyond the ken of the living. Each thoughtful man is faced with Job's problem—Job is everyman.

Here a minor digression is indicated. It is easy and tempting to read into the Book of Job a multitude of preconceptions, and to find in its texts the requisite supporting evidences. But if one were, by an excess of caution, to abstain from every attempt at interpretation, which always involves preconceptions, one would be deprived of all poetic creativity. Thought and experience were then indeed arid and prosaic. The symbol is the soul's vernacular, and the symbol cannot be understood literally, but only transliterally, that is, by being interpreted.

I posit as an interpretation of the Book of Job that it is primarily concerned with the meaning of life, that the issues of evil, and of the relationship between God and Man are implicated issues which, if abstracted from the primary concern with life's meaning, would themselves become meaningless.

And I am persuaded that this conjecture, this preconception if you please, can be validated by much solid, internal evidence. The Book of Job, I hold then, is not primarily a theosophic work. The central figure is neither Satan nor Jahveh, but Job, and the issue is between

Job and Job, not between Job and his Creator. Jung is seemingly of the same conviction, but he is brought to it by totally different considerations. Jung perceives in Job "the man who triumphed over Jahveh". "The victory of the vanquished and oppressed," writes Jung, "is obvious: Job stands morally higher than Jahveh. In this respect the creature has surpassed the creator." (ref. 1, p. 68.) But we are not yet in a position to take up Jung's *Answer to Job*. I must rather touch on what I consider to be some of the internal evidence justifying the opinion that the Book of Job is primarily philosophical rather than theosophical. I mean that the significance of the God figure is encompassed in the meaning of life, rather than the reverse. Historically, of course, the relation between the two is circular, but in the Book of Job the relation is magnificently fixed, contemplated, and expounded. Job's affirmation "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him," is an election, an attestation of will and not a confession of impotence. It is still meaningful, though never as sublime an affirmation when, in the credo of the Existentialist, Life displaces the Almighty. "Though life slay me, as indeed it inevitably must, yet will I trust in it. It also will be my salvation." Job exempts his Creator when he rebukes the foolish counsel of his wife "to curse God and die" with these simple words: "What! shall we receive good at the hand of the Lord, and shall we not receive evil?" Palpably Job intended life no less than the Lord, for is not the will, the intention of God made manifest in and through life? And yet, as I shall show later, God cannot be equated to the immediacies of life, and Job never intended such an equation. Job was not an Existentialist.

It is of interest that Job was tried when the days of his life were approaching the end of their biblical allotment. Job was three score and ten years of age when he was afflicted. Granted he was a most righteous and God-fearing man, but surely in the Land of Uz there were other pious and prosperous souls, younger men whom Jahveh might have given over to the sport of Satan. A younger man would have had greater hopes, higher ambitions, and hence deeper frustrations. His afflictions would have been greater, and his lamentations louder. Such a one might indeed have cursed God. Why then did the lot fall upon an old man. Plainly because it *is* the lot of every aging mortal to be so afflicted, but only rarely that of the young. For the young man affliction is misfortune, but for the old it is destiny. By

the same compelling reasons it was not a single affliction that tried Job's body and soul, but all of Cassandra's lot, including a shrewish wife and a triplet of unctuous, righteous, and garrulous friends. Job was a man keen in mind and sharp in perception, who had outlived his years and the transient pleasures of the early ages, and who in his lamentations reflected the tragic denouement of life's experience.

In the perspective of his long life Job perceived, as every reflective man must perceive, that there is no indwelling justice in life. Those trivia that are enacted by the occasional men of honesty at the counting tables of the mart or in the magistrates' courts are not justice, but only the exercise of governance in the traffic of man's every-day affairs.

He perceived, as every reflective man must perceive, that Evil indwells in life: Was it not recognized even in humanity's infancy that Father Chronos eats up his own children. Was it not said long, long ago, "only that man is fortunate who was never born." It was upon these problems that Job brooded. The problems are symbolized in his particular bereavements and afflictions, but they are, in effect, not singular to Job's life but common to everyman's. It is obvious then that the Book of Job is essentially a philosophic work, one that is rooted in life's experience, that seeks to abstract from life's experience the meaning of life, and that seeks to relate both experience and meaning to the all-embracing vision of God. Jastrow, to whose study of the Book of Job I have referred several times, also treats the Book of Job as philosophy (ref. 6, chapt. V). According to Jastrow, Job's philosophy was one of protest: one that raised questions: questions that bear upon the meaning of life. "It [the Book of Job] is the protest of profoundly religious spirits," wrote Jastrow, "who seek to unravel the mysteries of life and decline to content themselves with the repetition of meaningless phrases, or to be lulled to rest by a false view of conditions." (ref. 6, p. 153).

To unravel the mysteries of life, not to content oneself with the repetition of meaningless phrases, not to be lulled to rest by false views of actuality, has been the inspiring devotion that motivated the labors of mankind's elect. It was Freud's inspiring devotion, and *is* Jung's. But how radically different are the fruits of their respective labors.

Freud, seeking to unravel "the mysteries of life", achieved a great deal in laying bare the mechanisms of the psyche, but in the end he not only found no answer to the meaning of life, but was persuaded that

the question itself is meaningless. Life, Freud appears to affirm, is to be experienced, not to be understood. And in life both Men and Nature are malign. "The masses," Freud wrote, "are lazy and unintelligent, they have no love for instinctual renunciation, they are not to be convinced of its inevitability by argument, and the individuals support each other in giving full play to their unruliness." (ref. 3.) Nature, according to Freud, traduces us, she "does not ask us to restrain our instincts, she lets us do as we like; but she has her peculiar effective mode of restricting us: she destroys us, coldly, cruelly, callously, as it seems to us, and possibly just through what has caused our satisfaction." (ref. 3, p. 28.) In the purview of Freud individual man is on all sides hedged in by malice and malignity. Not love but dread binds man to his fellow men, and the resulting union has the essential character of an armistice 'tween man and man, and a united front of "All against Nature". Insecurity of life, an equal danger for all, Freud affirmed unites men into one society. (ref. 3, p. 71.) and it is the principal task of culture, its real *raison d'être*, to defend man against nature (ref. 3, p. 26).

Freud was not a gentle cynic. It is an enticing vision to picture Freud in the circle of Job's friends, sharing in what is called the Symposium, but which, indeed, was rather a lamentation for man and a dirge for life. I can fancy the cynical counsel that Freud would have proffered Job: to resign his childish expectations, the projection into senescence of his infantile wishes; to be stoical in the face of cruel nature which spares no man, and is indifferent to all; to die in the hopeful expectation that some remote generation of man would by the science of probabilities, inspired by the roulette wheel, formulate subtle schemes to insure the Jobs of the future against financial ruination resulting from the loss of their oxen, she-asses, camels, and sheep. In similar vein I can picture Freud consoling Job on the untimely death of his sons and daughters, and reflecting in sober spirit on the probability that this misfortune will inspire the scientists to discover ways to reinforce human dwellings. And to crown this vision, I can fancy Freud commiserating with Job over his plague of boils, and offering consolation in the forecast of the antibiotics, which surely would prove specific against every variety of boil. What I cannot and would not conjure up in fancy, is the withering scorn with which Job the Patriarch would respond to Freud's shallow cynicism, and to his naive faith in science.

In this presentiment it is not my intention to be flippant, nor to be disrespectful to the memory of a great man. After all, it was Freud who taught our generations to appreciate the dynamic reality and the potency of the Super-ego. And yet Freud *was* shallow in his cynicism and naive in his faith in Science. Otherwise, could he have failed to understand the full implications of the closing sentences of his *Future of an Illusion*, and understanding them could he have allowed them to stand as published? He wrote: "No, science is no illusion. But it would be an illusion to suppose that we could get anywhere else what *it* cannot give us." (ref. 3, p. 78.) This can have but one meaning: "What science cannot give us, cannot be gotten." This must include faith, hope, love, and charity.

Let me further quote Freud. His god is neither Jahveh nor Elohim, but *Logos* (the primacy of the intellect), linked to his twin, *Anagke* (external reality). "*Logos*," Freud affirms, will realize those of our wishes "which external nature permits, but he will do this very gradually, only in the incalculable future and for other children of men. Compensation for us, who suffer grievously from life, he does not promise." *Logos*, Freud's god, is seemingly no more just nor merciful than Job's Jahveh. The problem of evil remains unsolved.

Moses and Monotheism[4] was the last book written by Freud. At the time of its composition he was 82 years of age. It calls for no great perspicacity to recognize that in this exposition Freud identified himself with Moses—even Ernest Jones appreciated it. There is a something sibylline in this identification. Be it recalled that Moses led the Jews to the Promised Land—but did not himself enter it. For Moses had broken faith with the Lord at the Waters of Meribath-Kadesh in the desert of Zion. "Because you did not pay me due honor among the Israelites," said the Lord, "accordingly you shall view the land from a point of vantage; but you shall not enter the land which I am giving to the Israelites." (*Deuteronomy, 32:* 51-52.) Freud led us to, but did not "enter upon" the promised realm of the Super-ego. That remains for his followers and his inheritors to achieve.

The case is otherwise with Jung: but then, Jung is no Moses. This affirmation, I fear, may be a bit cryptic, but it will soon become clear, I trust.

Jung wrote an essay on Job with the title *Answer to Job*[1]. The title is without the article "an" or "the." This is a tortured book,

involved, discursive, of varying compactness and clarity, now diffuse and misty, now projecting clear and suggestive apparitions, like the face of a beloved one discerns in a cloud or in a fog. It is a distressing work. It irritates and angers. And yet it is so earnest, so groping, so babbling in its effort to articulate profundities, that one cannot cast it off, nor yet reject it.

Jung was 76 years of age when he ventured to catechize himself "as to the nature of those ruling ideas which decide our ethical behaviour and have such important influence on our practical life." (ref. 1, p. 83.) But the issues which intrigue Jung most are those dominant in Christianity; Christ as a symbolic figure, the apocalyptic Christ-Antichrist antagonism, the doctrines of redemption and of the *privatio boni*. These are the ruling ideas that preoccupy Jung, and which he believes are involved in the Job symposium. In addition Jung is concerned with the *complexio oppositorum*, with the inclusion in the God figure of the opposites of good and evil. It was this, Jung affirms, that recalled to his mind the story of Job—"Job who expected help from God against God." (ref. 1, p. 83.)

Jung's *Answer to Job*[1] is difficult to summarize. Its argument is elusive. One cannot grasp it in any sustained comprehension. At times it appears to be clearly crystallized and then it becomes opaque and amorphous—like sludge. It is not possible to establish from his exposition whether Jung conceives of Jahveh as a conceptual projection of Job's tortured mind, or as a heaven-dwelling tribal deity. He reifies his symbols, and appears to treat them as historical substantialities. It is not possible to arrive at any clear and final conclusion whether Jung treats of Christ as a symbolic figure, or is concerned with the symbolic potency of the figure of Christ. One thing does appear certain—Jung writes as a believing Christian, believing in the sense that he sees in Christianity the fulfillment of the Davidic promises, that of the birth and martyrdom of the Messiah. And yet, though patently believing, Jung is not pristinely orthodox. He scorns and ridicules the Christian affirmation that God so loved mankind that for its redemption He martyred His only begotten son—Jesus: "One should" Jung writes, "keep before one's eyes the strange fact that the God of Goodness is so unforgiving that he can only be appeased by a human sacrifice!" "This," he states, "is an insufferable incongruity which modern man can no longer swallow, for he must be blind if he does not see the

glaring light it throws on the divine character, giving the lie to all talk about love and the *Summum Bonum*." (ref. 1, p. 11.) Nor does Jung subscribe to the fundamental Article of Faith, that Christ *is* the Redeemer, the Messiah, and the Ultimate. He envisages, rather, if not the advent of a second Messiah, the sustained and continued operations in man, of the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, of Christian dogma. Half apologetically, half accusingly, Jung writes: "In the interest of continuity and the Church the uniqueness of the incarnation and of Christ's work of redemption has to be strongly emphasized, and for the same reason the continuing indwelling of the Holy Ghost is discouraged and ignored as much as possible. No further individualistic digressions can be tolerated." (ref. 1, p. 116.) Apologetically he adds: "If everybody had tried to thrust the intuitions of his own private Holy Ghost upon others for the improvement of the universal doctrine, Christianity would rapidly have perished in a Babelonian confusion of tongues." (ref. 1, p. 117.) But the times have changed, and now, Jung affirms, "the psychotherapist has more to say on these matters than the theologian, who has remained caught in his archaic figurative language". (ref. 1, p. 153.) The doctor very often is forced by the problems of psychoneurosis to look more closely at the religious problem, for "in the last resort the principles which, spoken or unspoken, determine the moral decisions upon which our existence depends, for weal or woe" are embraced "in the positive or negative concept of God". In a footnote Jung adds: "Psychologically the God concept includes every idea of the ultimate, of the first or last, of the highest or lowest. The name makes no difference." (ref. 1, p. 153.)

Those who are not at home in the vernacular of theological expositions, and who confront them in the same frame of mind that they bring to the consideration of mundane matters, must find Jung's words and ideas wearisome and arid. They are likely to react as Glover did, in a gesture of total rejection. It's all archaic, and vapid nonsense. But, I would humbly submit, it isn't. Jung speaks an odd and esoteric language, and frames his argument in the provincial format of Pauline Christianity, but he is a seer and his vision reveals deep, and great profundities. For all the labors involved, for all the toil it takes, Jung's *Answer to Job* is deserving of patient and sober study. In the end, it is a rewarding work, an inspiring and stimulating contribution to the understanding, if not to the solution, of the problem of Job, the

problem of the evil inherent in life. For Jung goes beyond the simple issue of God's justice, and treats of the *function* of evil in human existence. He posits that evil is an inseparable part of good, as death is inseparable from life: that good itself would not be good, apart from evil. Indeed it is the disjunction of the two—the dark from the light, the left from the right, the low from the high, that has brought our culture and the human race to the brink of individual and collective disaster and annihilation.

This formulation is easily misconceived, for so much depends upon what is intended and understood by evil. Thus Auschwitz was not evil. It was beyond evil, it was a prelude to Armageddon. The evil intended is that inherent in existence, and indwelling in the human psyche. It is that part of being which when reconciled and integrated yields all that is uniquely beautiful and esthetically good in culture and in civilization, and which in its highest transmutation engenders the vision of, and devotion to, the God concept.

It is interesting and noteworthy that when disencumbered of its Christian accents, Jung's dicta on good and evil are very similar to the Hasidic version. "The basic doctrine which fills the Hebrew Bible," wrote Martin Buber[7], "is that our life is a dialogue between the above and the below." This is more explicitly affirmed in the Kabbalah which so largely inspired and fashioned the teachings of Hasidism. ". . . the togetherness of man with God, with God who 'dwells with them in the midst of their uncleanliness,' purifies and hallows all; . . . man must serve God with the evil impulse too; . . . the redemption overcomes the division between clean and unclean, holy and profane; *all* becomes pure and holy," are articles of Hasidic faith[8]. It is written: "The abyss has opened; it is no more allowed to any man to live as if evil did not exist. One cannot serve God by merely avoiding evil; one must grapple with it." (ref. 8, p.30.) But to grapple with does not mean to destroy nor to repress. "The sparks of the light of God yearn for release from their deepest exile in that which we call evil." (ref. 8, p. 30.)

The Talmud teaches that man must serve God with both impulses (good and evil). "The Shekhina embraces both, the 'good' and the 'evil', but the evil not as an independent substance, but as the 'throne of goodness,' as 'the lowest step of utter good.' " (ref. 8, p. 52.)

I must resist the temptation to quote more and to expound further,

lest this be turned into an essay on Hasidism. Yet I would counsel those who are interested, to read Martin Buber's illuminating book on *Hasidism.*[8] It stands in such effulgent contrast to Jung's profound but murky exposition.

Freud, too, can be quoted to show that he was not unaware of the problem of good and evil. But Freud was confessedly no philosopher, and the oceanic feeling so requisite to a full appreciation of these matters was alien to his experience, and probably missing among his otherwise rich and varied endowments. His most pertinent contribution to this subject was his *Civilization and its Discontents,*[9] a work which he himself felt was rather "commonplace".

I fear that in this exposition Freud may appear to have fared badly and Jung more favorably. I would submit that I am not biased, nor a pleader. Certainly I must not be taken for a Jungian. If I must subscribe, I would subscribe to Paracelsus' motto "*Alterius non sit qui suis esse potest*".

At this point, coming to the end of my presentation, I want to anticipate and to respond to what I would consider a warranted query, namely: "What bearing has this upon psychiatry, and how can it profit the psychiatrist to fathom 'the lesson of Job,' or to wrestle with the problem of Good and Evil?" The obvious answer might be—it all depends upon the psychiatrist and on his understanding of what psychiatry embraces. But such an answer would be rather glib and uninforming. I'd rather respond to the query in earnest, and confessionally, that is in terms of how *I* became involved in this problem.

It was not any religious preoccupations that brought me into this realm, but rather certain very impressive and challenging experiences in psychiatric practice. Over a stretch of time I encountered a significant number of patients whose psychopathies seemingly derived from the absence of an effective Super-ego in the structure and operations of their psychic organism. They apparently did not and could not differentiate between good and evil in an operational sense. They were not dull, they knew in an informed way what the world at large terms "evil," and what it holds to be "good". They furthermore were as law-observing and as honest as the average person, or perhaps not quite as much, but sufficiently so to keep out of legal difficulties. The good and evil they could not understand or appreciate was that which is involved in inter-personal relations. They were not altruistic even in the most

elementary sense. They were unhappy souls and knew not the sources of their unhappiness. They belonged to that category of patient currently described as suffering from a character neurosis, a designation which I find adequately descriptive but not illuminating as to etiology or psychodynamics. Their pathology could not be understood nor explicated in the framework of Freudian psychodynamics, nor in that of any other school of psychiatric thought or teaching. In working with them I was in time persuaded that they lived life primitively, that is, without any orientation as to the human meaningfulness of the living experience. They had no sense of the evil inherent in life, nor of the need to accept and to reconcile the evil in order to gain the good. They were unwilling and unable to renounce, to give up, to yield, what was *seemingly* good, that is pleasurable and gratifying. They saw no reason for doing so. On the contrary their reason argued *to the contrary*. Why love your neighbor when it was more reasonable and more gratifying to hate him, and besides, as any one can perceive, the neighbor was more deserving of hate than of love? Furthermore, your neighbor takes you for a sucker if you do show him kindness and affection. But for the patients I have in mind the neighbor was not merely *the* neighbor, it was mankind entire.*

The fact, the resulting effect, that they themselves were not loved, that they were unhappy and ineffective, that they were as outcasts among men, taught them nothing and served only to embitter them. When they entered upon therapy, they did so in the expectation that somehow the therapist would conspire with them to devise means, and to structure ways, by which this nasty horde of humankind might be brought to its knees.

Confronted with this type of patient, with this order of psychopathy, how is one to deal with it? How is one to help the patient? One thing appeared certain to me—no therapist could help who had not in his own way, for himself, and beyond himself, grappled with the problem of Job, with the issue of the evil indwelling in Life. It is not requisite that he should have solved it, only that he should have grappled with it —as Jacob did with the Angel at *Peniel.*

As you have witnessed, I have grappled with the problem of Job. And I feel I owe it to myself no less than to you to state unequivocally

* Freud expounds this argument with his accustomed forcefulness in his *Civilization and Its Discontents*[9]. But Freud is not on the side of the angels.

where I take my stand 'tween Job, Jung, and Freud. It is by the side of Job. I cannot reconcile myself to, nor accept, the Christian faith in a life hereafter, wherein and whereat all injustices will be righted. This is seemingly Jung's ultimate answer to the problem of Evil.* To this extent I am more proximate to Freud than I am to Jung. And yet I cannot subscribe to Freud's mordant atheism. Freud understood very little of religion. He was compulsively obsessed with the rejection of that infantile consolation which Christianity and the later corrupted Judaism offered to the credulous, the belief in a life hereafter. In the Book of Job there is not one word of the hereafter, and the orthodox addendum pictures the Almighty rewarding Job's piety in the here and now, and not in the great beyond. But there is vastly more to Christianity than the myths of resurrection and Judgment Day, and more to Judaism than the archaic laws of Kashris. The totality of religion cannot be adjudged an Infantile Illusion. Religious faith is the supreme achievement of the human spirit, infinitely higher and greater than either Art or Science. For without it there would be no humanity, and hence no Art or Science.

Religion is not to be encompassed within reason, as Freud and many others have attempted, but it can be intelligized. The dimensions of one man's life experiences are too constrained to encompass the full magnitude of the meaning of life and his vision too feeble to perceive its outlines in the limitless expanse of time. And yet it lies not beyond the competences of man's understanding to perceive that living man is a time- and space-bound congelation of matter suspended between two eternities, the eternity of the past and that of the future, and serving to bind them together. For his soul's sake he must reconcile and subserve both. In this understanding man can achieve his attestation of the Godhead, gaining and bringing his tribute.

* In *God and the Unconscious* by Victor White[10], the following is quoted from one of Jung's letters: "On empirical grounds I am convinced that the soul is in part outside space and time (i.e., relatively eternal). Similarly the continuation of personal consciousness after death appears to me, on grounds of experience, to be probable."

In view of the fact that Jung wrote the introduction to this book, it may be assumed that the quotation is correct.

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